A Preliminary Theory of Power and Authority

To exert power is for some principle to cause some potential to become actual. For example, a tree has the power to grow, but it does not have the power to burn. A man, by contrast, cannot make a tree grow, but can only cooperate with the tree in this regard. But a man has the power to burn a tree. The tree has no potential to burn without this (or some similar) external power. So, the potential to burn follows from the will of a man as its principle. Power and potential are not identical terms: 'Power' refers to the relation of an object's potential to the principle of that potential. Hence a tree has the potential to burn, but it does not have the power to burn.

Authority is the principle by which power is ordered to its proper end. A man may have the power to burn a tree without the authority to do so. Likewise, a man may have the authority to burn a tree without the power to do so. Authority serves to direct power to its end both by informing an agent in power (e.g. by issuing lawful commands) and by ensuring the agreement of the application of power with order (e.g. through prudential consideration). Hence, the ordinary expression of authority is law. Power without authority decays, but with authority it is sustained. Authority does not necessitate acts of power; rather, power is the means of fulfilling the aim of authority. 

Notes on "Evil Societies"

A community is an association of persons united by a common good. The nature of that good determines the nature of the association which is ordered to it.

If an association does not have a good as its unitive principle, then it is not, properly speaking, a community. However, as persons associate for a variety of specific intentions, and it is impossible to intend an evil per se, there is no association that is evil per se. However, while there can always be found at least a vestigial good by which every personal association is sought, an association that is not oriented to a common good only has the appearance of a community.

An association that is made purely from individual intentions, and thus fails to give rise to communion, might be called an "evil society" if it is directly detrimental to the attainment of any common good. As a corpse or a wax sculpture might resemble a living creature, so can an evil society resemble a community.

The most prevalent kind of evil society is a kind of economic association; that is, an association that is sought for purely economic intentions; that is, aimed at the acquisition of individual -- i.e. material -- goods. Both crime syndicates and large-scale corporations can have such a character.

There can be real communities of a purely economic nature, so long as they serve a common good by providing for the material resources necessary for its fulfilment. But, of course, without a proper relation to the common good, such associations are not communities properly speaking. Furthermore, it is likely that such an association (whose intended goods, though individual, are necessary for the attainment of higher goods) is a serious detriment to the development of real community. In other words, it is quite rare to find an innocuous economic association which is not immediately subordinated to the common good.

He who has authority over a community will therefore find such evil societies to be his greatest enemies.

Peace

The common idea of peace is a negative one: Peace is not war. Thomas Hobbes, one of the fathers of liberalism, is partly to blame for this impoverished view. In Leviathan, he writes, “the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is Peace.” Hobbes argues that peace is simply the absence of war, and war is the natural state of man’s relation to man. For Hobbes, therefore, peace is not a natural inclination, but an imposition. But evidence against this view is everywhere: The best and most humane human beings desire peace, not conflict. And to anyone actually acquainted with war, the idea that peace is enforced because war comes naturally must seem a bit funny.

Hobbes’ argument about the nature of peace and war is a new one. Saint Augustine, who was well educated and heavily influenced by Plato, Cicero, and the Stoics, maintains that all things strive for peace. In City of God, he clearly explains what he means by ‘peace’; a “harmony of congruous elements” and “the tranquility of order.” Augustine always speaks of peace with respect to order: The peace of the body is ordered proportion, the peace of the irrational soul is the order of appetites, the peace of the human soul is the order of intellect and will, etc. Peace with respect to human association is, as Augustine says, “the ordered agreement of mind with mind.” This peace is what characterizes the peace hoped for in the “earthly city” (human society). Still more noble than this peace is the peace of the Heavenly City, “a perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and a mutual fellowship in God.”

Peace, therefore, is an attribute of perfected nature. Because man has a rational nature which inclines him to associate with other men, the perfection of human association must involve an accordance of reason. It is contrary to man’s nature to place the goods of the body above spiritual goods, hence a man who does so is disordered and is not at peace. Likewise, it is contrary to man’s nature to love himself over the commonweal, hence one who sacrifices the common good for the sake of personal gain destroys the peace he enjoys with other men.

Of course, the earthly city is marred by a variety of evils that corrupt the natural order by which man attains peace. The earthly city (along with its rulers and laws) is not evil by nature, because nothing is naturally evil. But because of the effects of sin, it is perennially disordered. We can enjoy true peace only in the Heavenly City, whose order is the Love of God.

The greatest sign of the earthly city’s inability to attain true and lasting peace is the state of human justice. Justice, according to Augustine, is the virtue which sets man in relation to the city as a citizen. It is the virtue by which man participates in society for the sake of the common good. In other words, peace is realized through justice. But justice is practically impossible due to the effects of original sin. Man is damaged, born into a state of disorder. He cannot attain justice without grace. Therefore, the only recourse one has for attaining true peace is to God: That is, only by receiving grace as a citizen of the Heavenly City can one be a true citizen at all.

Saint Augustine acknowledges the goodness of man’s nature, and by extension the goodness of political association. But he adamantly opposes the notion that the earthly city can be perfected in practice; for man is corrupt and in dire need of God’s grace. Yet, even in his low estimation of the merits of human politics, Augustine holds that the earthly city can help its citizens attain true peace by helping them to participate in the Heavenly City. And when citizens have true peace, the earthly city itself can benefit from the grace merited by that participation.

Peace is a positive good that is shared between persons. It requires active participation by those who share it. It is the natural state of relations between human beings; it is integral to human nature. We crave it from the depths of our being. Because peace flows from human nature, we must put our natural capacities -- our minds and our hearts -- to work in it. Peace, then, is not synonymous with truce. It involves cooperation and commitment to a mutually held understanding of the true and the good. Hence, the most challenging aspect of peace: In order to share peace, we must share the truth.

It is no surprise then that a misunderstanding of peace would follow a denial of our ability to share the truth. And this was exactly the motivation behind Hobbes’ thesis. He was well aware of the terrors of the Religious Wars, which spread a despair for peace throughout Europe.

But Hobbes did not offer a new and effective way to achieve peace amidst a growing divergence of opinion. Rather, what he and his legacy embraced was a method of waging war more efficiently. As all the great military strategists have taught, a skilled general will overwhelm, deceive, divide, and intimidate his enemy. He controls the terms of engagement. He knows all. But most importantly, a general has mastered war when he can conquer his enemy without shedding blood. The ruler of the state, in Hobbes’ vision, is not concerned with peace at all, but with waging war on his own citizens.

Let us once more revisit Hobbes’ thesis: Peace is the absence of conflict, and conflict is only avoided by the threat of an all-powerful state with a monopoly on violence. But intimidation and threats are the marks of a power at war. So, if peace is simply the absence of war, is there such a thing as peace? The answer is, “no.”

In short, the Hobbesian idea of peace -- i.e. the modern, liberal idea of peace -- is indistinguishable from war.

A Crash Course in Thomistic Politics

To properly understand the political order as St. Thomas understands it, we must begin with human nature. A thing’s nature constitutes formal, material, and final cause. With respect to man, his formal cause is the soul, which acts in and through his material cause, the body by which it lives. But man’s soul is preeminently rational, so he is endowed with reason and will, in whose activity man is not dependent upon the material, but is capable of knowing the truth and directing his will in love toward the good.

The true and the good are the proper objects of intellect and will, respectively. Hence, man’s knowledge and love are not mere “capacities” in the sense that a porcupine is capable of flight (provided it gains enough momentum). Rather, man finds his perfection in the operations proper to his nature, to which he is ordered by a final cause. It is with respect to final cause that St. Thomas understands the good, since what accords with a thing’s final cause is identical to its own perfection, and is said to be that thing’s good.

It is important to note that, although man finds his supreme good in the perfection of his intellect and will, the highest faculties of his soul, he exists as a suppositum, a substantial whole which includes every aspect of his nature, including his body. Hence, man’s good is both material and spiritual, involving every perfection of his body and soul.

The Common Good

The common good is defined as that good which is had by participation. Because St. Thomas identifies absolute Good as an aspect of Being, he says, “in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation.” However, we can understand the common good more narrowly with respect to the goods of human association, as opposed to goods which are exclusive to an individual.

In other words, a good is a common good if and only if it is common. Individual goods are exclusive, and are proper only to the individual as such. For example, food is an individual good, because it can only be consumed as food by an individual; peace is a common good, because it can only be enjoyed as the tranquility of order between persons. Multiple individuals cannot eat the same morsel, nor can one man enjoy peace in isolation.

The more particular goods one identifies, both common and individual, the more it becomes apparent that material goods are always proper to the individual as individual goods, whereas common goods are always proper to rational beings as goods of the soul. Hence, Aristotle notes that man, by virtue of his rational nature, is most suited to social life and is appropriately defined as a political animal. It is in light of this relation between reason and political participation that De Koninck identifies the common good as the greatest good proper to man:

The highest good of a man belongs to him not insofar as he is himself a certain whole in which the self is the principal object of his love, but "insofar as he is part of a whole," a whole which is accessible to him because of the very universality of his knowledge[…] Thus it is indeed as part that we are ordered to this greatest of all goods which can only be ours most completely through being communicable to others.

In other words, because the highest perfection of man is the perfection of his rational soul, and the common good is available to man insofar as he is rational, then man’s highest good must be a common good.

The End of Politics

Aristotle, whose thought is a major influence on Thomas’ political philosophy, begins his discussion of politics in the Ethics, identifying the “master art” as that which deals with the most excellent good proper to man:

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good[...] We must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature…”

What Aristotle then treats of in the Ethics, namely, the development of virtue, which St. Thomas ultimately considers to be the perfection of man’s nature, is brought to completion in the Politics.

Aristotle understands political association as an activity with the express view of attaining the good: “Observation shows us, first, that every polis is a species of association, and, secondly, that all associations come into being for the sake of some good -- for all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, a good.” St. Thomas follows Aristotle closely on this point, but stresses an important qualification, as he comments, “all men perform everything they do for the sake of that which is seen as a good, whether it is truly good or not.”

The subtle shift from the good in itself to “what is seen as a good” reveals an important characteristic of political association. Only beings of a rational nature are able to direct themselves to the good according to their own understanding. When man understands and chooses what is truly good, this constitutes human freedom, a freedom which non-rational beings do not have. Therefore, the ability to enter into political association for the sake of the common good can be seen as a manifestation of this freedom, though this freedom is only realized with respect to what is truly good.

Species of Association

St. Thomas, in his commentary on the Politics, delineates the various types of human association. As the guiding principle of his treatment, he states that, “every human association is an association according to certain acts.” With this observation in mind, he begins with a discussion of the most fundamental sphere of human association, namely, domestic society.

Domestic society, Thomas notes, is an association for the sake of the everyday necessities of human life. These necessities can be divided into two activities; that which generates human life, and that which preserves it. The first activity of domestic society, therefore, is proper to the association of husband and wife, an association that is common also to plants and animals. The second activity of domestic society is that of ruler and subject: This association is not necessarily one of master and slave, but involves any relationship whereby useful work is made effective enough for the fulfillment of daily needs. These two associations together constitute domestic society.

For Thomas, the next order of society is the village, which is composed of several households, and is characterized by communal activity that is not everyday, or at least not of immediate necessity. In modern context, some of the activities which might be relegated to this association are waste disposal, public transportation, or the paving of roads.

 Lastly, Thomas considers the city to be (in the order of nature) the perfect society, because it is entirely sufficient for the necessities of human life. On this level of association, not only daily necessities, but the various activities necessary for the preservation of human society are carried out, such as the levying of taxes or martial defense. However, in each of these associations, reference has been made only to individual goods of a material nature.

As stated above, the ultimate goal of human association is not individual goods, but spiritual, common goods. St. Thomas, well aware of this, states that “from [the city’s] existence it comes about that men not only live but that they live well, in so far as by the laws of the city the life of men is ordered to the virtues.” It is through the city that laws are made, which are necessary to educate its citizens in virtue; and virtue, in turn, is necessary for human perfection.

Law

St. Thomas defines law as having four essential characteristics; “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.” The most universal law is the Eternal Law, which is the ratio of divine governance. All of creation, receiving its being from God, attains its perfection according to this intelligible order. The natural law is the participation in the Eternal Law by rational creatures. Insofar as the human person apprehends the order of creation of which he is a part, and directs his action in accord with it, he conforms himself to the natural law.

The law which is legislated by cities is called the human law. This law is derived from the natural law as the application of its precepts for a particular community, but is enforced by human authority:

Something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details[…] Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.”

Every human being is governed equally by the natural law, but human law is subject to change according to culture or custom.

That human law is mutable does not imply that it is arbitrary, as if it followed from the will of civil authority without qualification. Rather, human law, insofar as it is directed for the particularities of a given community, is guided by justice at the service of regnitive prudence: That is, because justice renders to each person what is due according to the order of reason, an unjust law is without reason, and so a human law has the character of law only insofar as it is just.

Human law is not necessary only for the sake of educating citizens in virtue, else a virtuous people would need no law. Yet even a virtuous citizenry still acts for the sake of the common good which can only be enjoyed in community. Hence, the existence of law is not determined by the lack of perfection among the citizens it governs; rather, it is the rational principle by which the order of the community is governed and by which the common good is made possible. Gilson explains this notion as follows:

[R]eason directs a person’s acts for his own welfare; but this individual lives in society and is a member of the body politic, and, as is always the case with groups, he is directed in view of the whole of which he is a part. This or that man’s reason, though qualified to guide his actions for his welfare, is not, therefore, qualified to shape them for the good of the community to which he belongs, and to subordinate them to it.

Human law can therefore be understood as analogous to the Eternal Law: As all creatures find their perfection by participation in the Eternal Law, which precedes them as the principle of that perfection, so too does every human association attain its perfection by cooperation in human law, which is the organizing principle of that association

Participation

Does the common good have primacy over the person, or is the person completely inviolable, even in the name of the common good? Understanding this question in a Thomistic context, the answer is something of a compromise between the two apparent options. In coming to this determination, however, we must discern what the person is, what the common good is, and what the relation is between the person and the common good. Once we grasp the full scope of this relation, we must conclude that the human person can only be perfected by acting for the sake of the common good.^[1]

The Individual and the Person

In discussing the human person, we will make use of Jacques Maritain’s distinction between man-as-individual and man-as-person. Before defining the ‘person,’ however, we will consider what Maritain thinks about the individual:

Outside of the mind, only individual realities exist. Only they are capable of exercising the act of existing. Individuality is opposed to the state of universality which things have in the mind. It designates that concrete state of unity and indivision, required by existence, in virtue of which every actually or possibly existing nature can posit itself in existence as distinct from other beings. The angels are individual essences; the Divine Essence, in Its sovereign unity and simplicity, is supremely individual.^[2]

We know what an individual is intuitively: when one comes to know what a thing is, his intellect defines that thing by differentiating it from others; specifically within a genus, and individually with reference to determinate matter.^[3] This definition is the expression of the thing’s essence, which is, independent of the human intellect, the composite of substantial form and determinate matter.^[4]

We cannot say, however, that only individual realities exist outside the mind absolutely, because nothing exists outside the mind of God. Everything is intelligible precisely because it has form: This form exists substantially outside the human intellect, but the existence of each form ultimately depends upon God, Who renders the forms intelligible and is the first formal cause of all things.^[5] In short, all creatures exist by virtue of the Divine Intellect.

Moreover, everything participates in Being according to its essence, which is the source of its apparent individuality, but a thing is not identical to its essence. For example, every man is made according to a common nature, human nature, which is not only essential, but teleological. Interwoven in the essential union of form and matter is his final cause. To understand this “interweaving,” however, we must look past the immediate cause of man's being toward his ultimate Cause.

A thing is a man if it has a human form, but no man is self-informed: It is God who informs man. Hence, every man has an immediate formal cause, which is his soul, and an ultimate formal cause, which is God. Because substantial form is the determining factor of a thing's essence, and a thing's essence is its participation in Being, we may say that the immediate formal cause is a participation in the ultimate formal cause.

Though formal causation explains a man's existence simply, his nature is not fully understood without reference to final causation.^[6] A thing’s final cause is simply that for the sake of which it acts. Therefore, whatever is good for a thing is good insofar as it concurs with its final cause.^[7] Like all beings, man has a proximate final cause, which is his own perfection, and an ultimate final cause, which is God.^[8] The ultimate final cause is not separate from the proximate final cause; rather, the latter is pursued for the sake of the former. Therefore, a creature approaches its perfection insofar as it approaches its last End.

Man, however, differs from irrational creatures in the way by which he attains his ultimate final cause: He is not ordered merely for God, but attains his end by knowing and loving God.^[9] In other words, man is set above irrational creatures in that he attains his ultimate final cause, and thereby reaches his perfection, in the contemplation of the Divine.^[10]

That man's perfection involves contemplation is indicative of Maritain's distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘person.’ Maritain observes that rational beings are not merely individuals, as St. Thomas says,“‘person’ signifies what is most perfect in all nature -- that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.”^[11] In other words, personality is an aspect of the individual’s rationality. Maritain concludes, “personality, therefore, signifies interiority to self… it is the spirit in man which takes him, in contrast to the plant and animal, beyond the threshold of independence properly so called…”^[12]

Though every creature is ordered toward the Good, the irrational creature’s participation in the Good is passive to the agency of Divine Providence.^[13] Human beings, on the other hand, attain their ultimate End through the free exercise of reason and will. Therefore, their orientation to the Good is preeminently personal.

Having thus far distinguished essence from nature, we can see that individuality alone does not give us a complete picture of a man, because individuality is determined by merely essential characteristics (viz. specific form and determinate matter). Rather, each man is uniquely personal because of his rational nature, which includes not only his substantial form (i.e. his rational soul), but the end toward which his reason is ordered.

Hence, we may say that, because a man is a person, he transcends his individuality through the use of his active intellect. However, that man's powers are active in the attainment of his end does not preclude the participatory aspect of that end: The very act of intellection itself is perfected and governed by the Divine Intellect.^[14] Therefore, man’s personality elevates him into a higher and more complete participation than that of the individual.

That the human intellect is a participation in the Divine Intellect can be seen in at least two ways. Firstly, man is by nature a rational animal, ordered to the use of his intellect by God. Therefore, the very act of intellection is a participation in the order of Divine Governance. Secondly, there must be an intelligent principle by which things are rendered intelligible. Man’s active intellect abstracts intelligible forms from that which he perceives; but the human intellect does not render the forms intelligible. Rather, forms are intelligible because they are the product of a higher Intelligence.^[15] Therefore, even man’s free act of reason is a participation in the Divine Intellect.^[16]

The Common Good

Now that an account of man has been given with respect to his individuality and his personality, we must take note of the recurring theme of participation. Man participates in Being according to his essence; he participates in the order of creation according to his nature, by acting for the sake of his final cause; and he participates in the Divine Intellect through the act of intellection. Furthermore, man’s rational nature indicates that human beings are not mere individuals, but persons; hence the highest mode of participation in the Good, which man enjoys as a rational creature, is preeminently personal.

That good in which things participate is the common good. Because every creature is ordered to God by way of its proximate final cause, we may say that every private good (i.e. the immediate good of the individual) is ordered ultimately to participation in the Common Good. Hence Thomas says, “in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation.”^[17] This order of participation has its source in the Divine Intellect, which creates and governs all creation for Himself. It is therefore apparent that the extrinsic Common Good, in which all of creation participates, is none other than God Himself.

Even man’s particular, free acts of the will are ultimately ordered to the Common Good as their ultimate end.^[18] However, we recall the difference between the participation of irrational creatures and that of persons: Irrational creatures participate by the necessity of nature, impressed upon them by their Creator, whereas persons (albeit in accord with their nature) participate by their own rational choice. Therefore, because participation requires the ordinance of reason, and reason is distinctly personal, we may conclude that the common good is fundamentally personal.^[19]

Man's Relation to Man

We have thus far dealt with the participation of creation, especially that of the human person, in Divine Providence. Our discussion would not be complete, however, without touching upon the intrinsic common good of human society. Human persons are capable not only of participating in the order of Divine Providence, but of participating in a variety of relations that are shared with other human persons.

It would be misleading to assert that, because human society is primarily expressed in terms of relations, it is merely a relation; accidental or “emergent” upon the individuals who participate in it. Just as it belongs to man’s nature to participate in the ultimate Common Good, so too is it proper to man to participate in human society: He does not merely adopt society with other persons. He is born in it; moulded by it. His relation to other persons is not a mental categorization; rather, it imparts on him a unique character which determines how he communicates himself to others (as son, father, teacher, legislator, etc.).

That man is by nature ordered to participate in human society is primarily evident in his use of language.^[20] Language itself is a common good, and not only does it have a uniquely human and inter-personal character, but it forms the very content of man’s rationality. Therefore, without some participation in human society, the person is, as Aristotle poetically quipped, “either a beast or a god.”^[21]

Even the person who has fulfilled every other requirement of nature has need of human community. A brief example of this need can be seen in St. Thomas’ consideration of friendship:

If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.^[22]

Note that the person’s participation in friendship is not exclusively for his own sake, but for the sake of his friends, and for the fellowship which is irreducible to any individual good.

Conclusion

In discussing the nature of the human person and his participation in the common good, we have come to two important conclusions. The first is that the human person cannot be understood without reference to the common good for which he is ordered. The second is that the common good cannot be anything other than that good which is preeminently personal. To say that the good of the person cannot be violated for the sake of the common good is inconsequential, because the common good is the highest good of the person. Likewise, to say that the common good has primacy over the person implies that the common good can exist outside the relation of persons, which has been proven false. Therefore, to fully understand man, we must duly consider both his personality and the common good for which he is made.

---

[1] We assume the distinction between the order of nature and the order of grace, and will discuss only the the order of nature, as grace is more suited to theological discussion.

[2] Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, 3, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947). At https://www3.nd.edu/~maritain/jmc/etext/CG03.HTM

[3] I.e. a species is differentiated within a genus by an essential difference; an individual is differentiated within a species by determinate matter.

[4] Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), 36 (IV.iii).

[5] Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, II, 4, 320, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), at https://dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics.htm.

[6] Aristotle, Physics, trans. Joe Sachs (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011), pg. 66.

[7] Aristotle, Physics, trans. Sachs, 195a 26 (pg. 55).

[8] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 44, a. 4, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger, 1947), at https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/

[9] Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 1, a. 8, trans. English Dominican Province.

[10] Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 2087, trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[11] Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, trans. English Dominican Province.

[12] Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, 3, trans. Fitzgerald.

[13] Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3, trans. English Dominican Province.

[14] Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3, trans. English Dominican Province.

[15] Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 79, a. 4, trans. English Dominican Province.

[16] Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, 22, 1, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, SJ (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), at https://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer.htm.

[17] Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 103, a. 2, trans. English Dominican Province.

[18] Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2, trans. English Dominican Province.

[19] We might be more precise to say “interpersonal,” but space forbids miring ourselves in terminology.

[20] Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 1253a3-17, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[21] Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 1253a29, trans. Barker

[22] Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 4, a. 8, trans. English Dominican Province.

Ethics, Politics, and the Common Good

Aristotle identifies politics as the chief architectonic science, as it deals with the ultimate end of human life. Yet this description is given at the beginning of the Ethics. Indeed, ethics and politics are intimately connected. In order to understand this relation fully, we must determine how they are distinct with regard to their origin, method, and end. Once properly distinguished, the conclusion follows that politics makes use of the principles of ethics, but for a greater and more noble end, the common good.

Ethics
In beginning of the Ethics, Aristotle discusses the ultimate end of man:

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good[...] We must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature… (NE I.2)

Aristotle then lays out the method of this “most authoritative art” and concludes the first part of the Ethics with a brief discussion of the “chief good.” The chief good is the end of ethics, so ethics may be defined as “the art which is pursued for the sake of man’s ultimate end.” Sometimes Aristotle calls ethics an art, sometimes a science. This dual characterization is possible because ethics is a practical science.
The sciences are divided into the speculative and the practical. The speculative sciences are pursued for the sake of knowledge itself, and thus do not have their end in operation. For example, mathematics is a speculative science, because the process and the conclusions of mathematics are inoperative: That is, perfect mathematics does not involve praxis. The method of the speculative sciences is resolutory, which means that knowledge proceeds from effect to cause, resolving complex truths into simple truths. For example, the mathematician may deduce a single function from a complex set of discrete data.
The practical sciences, on the other hand, are ordered to operation. For example, carpentry involves a method and acquisition of knowledge, but carpentry is not complete if it does not involve the activity of making things from wood. The method of the practical sciences is compository, which means that they proceed from simple to complex truths. For example, a carpenter, knowing that the height of a 45-degree angle is identical to its width, discerns the correct pitch of a roof and decides to cut the webs at equal lengths.
Ethics is a science that is, in a sense, both speculative and practical, and therefore its method is variable. In ethics, one may resolve complex truths into the simple, such as when one derives from the relationship of persons the principle of justice. But the speculative aspect of ethics is subordinated to the practical: That is, the principles derived in ethics must be put into practice in particular cases. In other words, ethics is not complete if it is not practiced, and so it is primarily a practical science. Therefore, ethics is a science insofar as it involves the attainment of knowledge, and an art insofar as this knowledge is put into practice.
Every art is done for some end, and the end of ethics is happiness. Aristotle defines happiness as, “an activity in accordance with virtue,” especially “the highest virtue… of the best part in us.” We know that the intellect is the best part of man because it is by his intellect that he participates in the natural law and is able to become virtuous at all. Moreover, the intellect is what distinguishes man apart from the other animals; it is the intellect which is the most human part of him. Thus the activity of the intellect, which is the contemplation of truth, is man’s greatest happiness, and the end of the virtuous life.

Politics
So, how does politics differ from ethics? Aristotle notes in the beginning of the Politics: “Observation shows us, first, that every polis is a species of association, and, secondly, that all associations come into being for the sake of some good -- for all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, a good.” Therefore, as the good is the end of ethics, the good of the community is the end of politics.
The method of political science is also similar to that of ethics. Politics is a practical science, as St. Thomas explains, “since the practical sciences are distinguished from the speculative sciences in that the speculative sciences are ordered exclusively to the knowledge of the truth, whereas the practical sciences are ordered to some work, [politics] must be comprised under practical philosophy, inasmuch as the city is a certain whole that human reason not only knows but also produces.”
Because politics is a practical science, its method is therefore, like ethics, compository. Thomas explains, “since human reason has to order not only the things that are used by man but also men themselves, who are ruled by reason, [politics] proceeds in either case from the simple to the complex.” However, though the method of politics as a science is similar to that of ethics, the practice of politics as an art is quite different. Because it is ordered not to the happiness of one person, but to the happiness of the whole community, it is necessary to have political activity beyond the scope of ethics.
Aristotle notes that most men are not capable of pursuing a moral education because they are not well disposed to practice virtue by their own inclination. And, though a man be eager to pursue the good, and learns how he might attain it, he will not attain the good until he acts. Likewise, St. Thomas observes:

A man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed… (ST Ia-IIae, q.95, a.1)

Hence the activity of political art has two chief characteristics; the didactic, which educates citizens in virtue, and the coercive, which disciplines citizens in the practice of virtue.

Law
This dual activity of politics is called government, and is done by way of legislation (the creation of laws). Law in general has four essential characteristics; it is “[1] an ordinance of reason [2] for the common good, [3] made by him who has care of the community, and [4] promulgated.” The natural law governs all moral activity, as it is the rational creature’s participation in the Eternal law. Politics, however, makes use of human law.
The human law manifests the dual method of moral science; its resolutory derivation of principles and compository application to particular cases. As Thomas explains:

Something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details[…] Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law. (ST Ia-IIae, q.95, a.2)

Thus, the human law is a rational participation in the natural law, and is therefore an ordinance of reason.
But, while the natural law is a participation in the eternal law promulgated by God, the human law is promulgated by human authority. Thus there is a distinction between ethics and politics in its relationship to authority. The man who acts virtuously obeys the natural law from God. But citizens are also bound to obey laws that are enacted by human authority in the art of politics. Human authority participates in God’s authority insofar as it derives its principles from the natural law and seeks to attain the end for which the natural law itself is promulgated.

The Common Good
Ethics and politics are further distinguished in their relation to the end for which all law is promulgated. Ethics instructs man in virtue, the end of which is his own happiness. But because virtue is necessarily in accord with the natural law, it also contributes to the common good. Yet ethics is concerned with human acts and happiness simply. Politics, on the other hand, governs the whole community with the explicit end of attaining the common good. Therefore, the greatest distinction between ethics and politics is their relation to the common good. So, in order to understand this distinction well, the common good itself must be well understood.
The common good is called “common” because it is participatory. Strictly speaking, every good is common insofar as it is participatory, as Thomas says, “in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation.” This is not to say that there is no such thing as a “private good,” but that every good is ordered to some end, and to have a good is to participate in this order.
The common good is therefore defined as the good of the whole for which its parts are ordered. Because the common good is the end toward which its members participate, it is manifested primarily in the peace and order of its members. The most immediate example of the common good is the end of the domestic household; the peace and order of the family. For the peace of the family, the husband must provide for the good of his wife and children, the wife must care for her husband and children, and the children must respect one another and obey their parents. Each well-lived role has the character of virtue, and redounds to the happiness of each person, but the end of domestic virtue is not the happiness of any one person, but of the whole household.
Because all personal goods are ordered to the common good, the common good is better. The primacy of the common good over that of one person is summarized by Aristotle:

If the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. (NE I.2, 1094b)

The primacy of the common good over the personal is not quantitative but categorical. That is, the common good is not the total sum of all personal goods: A pie, for instance, is not the common good of all who have a slice, because each slice that is taken from the pie diminishes the good available to others. Rather, the common good only increases by added participation; as the citizens grow in number and virtue, so grows the peace and order of the city.
That the common good is greater and prior to personal good does not imply that the common good is detrimental to the person. As Aristotle explains, it is quite the contrary:

The city is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual. The reason for this is that the whole is necessarily prior to the part. If the whole body is destroyed, there will not be a foot or a hand, except in the ambiguous sense… All things derive their essential character from their function and their capacity; and it follows that if they are no longer fit to discharge their function, we ought not to say that they are still the same things, but only that, by an ambiguity, they still have the same names. (Pol I.2, 1253a18)

That is, a single person cannot attain the good apart from the whole to which he is ordered. Man, being a political animal by nature, attains his good by participation in the community of which he is a part. As Charles De Koninck argues, the common good is in fact each man’s highest good:

The highest good of a man belongs to him not insofar as he is himself a certain whole in which the self is the principal object of his love, but "insofar as he is part of a whole," a whole which is accessible to him because of the very universality of his knowledge[…] Thus it is indeed as part that we are ordered to this greatest of all goods which can only be ours most completely through being communicable to others. (De Koninck, 30)

The community to which man is ordered is not limited to the civitas. There is a variety of common goods which exist in a hierarchy, as there is of particular goods, and the degree to which man participates in each good determines its greatness. Therefore, God Himself is the greatest common good, because man participates in God by virtue of his very being.

Objections to the Primacy of the Common Good
We will consider three objections against the common good’s primacy over the person. Firstly, though politics is necessary for the governance of the human community, the individual who is well disposed to contemplate needs no human governance. The contemplative man has attained moral excellence and is led by his own knowledge. Thus, it would seem that the act of contemplation falls outside the purview of politics. Secondly, while it is necessary to pursue virtue in communion with others, contemplation itself is a solitary act, and so the highest good for the person is not the common good. Thirdly, appeal might be made to the dignity of the person, which is primary to the common good on account of its inviolability. That is, the dignity of the human person cannot be violated for the sake of another good.
To the first objection, we respond that politics is necessary not only because many persons are ill-disposed to pursue virtue by their own inclination, but because participation is impossible without an external governing principle. The good of the whole, as its end, is external to whatever participates in it. For example, the good of a man, though it involves a well-functioning hand, is not limited to the good of the hand itself: A man’s good is external to the good of his hand, because his hand is ordered to the good of the whole man. Moreover, because the good of the whole man is external to that of his hand, his hand is incapable of attaining this external good of its own principle.
Therefore, even if every member of the community were perfect in virtue, an external governing principle would be necessary to attain peace and order, as Etienne Gilson summarizes:

This or that man’s reason, though qualified to guide his actions for his welfare, is not, therefore, qualified to shape them for the good of the community to which he belongs, and to subordinate them to it. Here is the basis of the exteriority, so far as the individual is concerned, of the principle which obliges his activity. Law, then, will express the demands of reason ordering the individual’s life in view of the common good of his group and speaking from the outside in the name of that group. (Gilson, 195)

The exteriority of the human law to each person is a reflection of the natural law from which it is derived. Man’s participation in the eternal law, while it orders him as a part of the Eternal law, is ordered to God Himself, who is external to man.
To the second objection, it should be noted that, though the end of ethics is the contemplation of Truth, contemplation is itself a special participation in the highest Good common to all things. Truth is not made private by man’s grasp of it. Though a solitary act by outward appearance, the activity of man’s intellect is itself a participation in the light of the Divine Intellect. Therefore, when one contemplates, he does not ascend from a good shared by the community to a noble personal good; rather, he ascends from a lesser common good to a greater common good.
To the third objection, we reply that personal dignity itself is derived from participation in the common good. Any attempt to elevate the singular person above the common good of which he is part only diminishes personal dignity, as De Koninck explains:

Through disordered love of singularity, one practically rejects the common good as a foreign good and one judges it to be incompatible with the excellence of our singular condition. One withdraws thus from order and takes refuge in oneself as though one were a universe for oneself, a universe rooted in a free and very personal act. One freely abdicates dignity as a rational creature in order to establish oneself as a radically independent whole. (De Koninck, 35)

To assert that personal dignity is something greater than its source is to say that the part, which is good insofar as it is ordered to the whole, is also good without the whole. This is absurd.

Conclusion
We may therefore conclude that ethics is not distinct from politics as an “individual” rule from a communal rule, but as the practical science of man’s good from the practical science of the common good. Ethics is ordered to the common good implicitly, and politics makes use of the principles of ethics in ordering man to the common good. Therefore, while ethics may be considered to be a “self-sufficient” science with respect to each person, it is essentially a part of politics.

Bibliography
Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. trans. David Ross. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Aristotle. Politics. trans. Ernest Barker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

De Koninck, Charles. On the Primacy of the Common Good. 1997. At https://thomasaquinas.edu/pdfs/aquinas-review/1997/1997-dekoninck-common-good.pdf

Gilson, Etienne. Moral Values and the Moral Life: The Ethical Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. trans. Leo Richard Ward. (reprint by Kessinger publishing).

Oesterle, John A. Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1957.

Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics. trans. C.I. Litzinger, O.P. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964. At https://dhspriory.org/thomas/Ethics.htm

Thomas Aquinas. Sententia Libri Politicorum. trans. Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D. O’Neill. At https://dhspriory.org/thomas/Politics.htm

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger bros., 1947. At https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html.