The Order of War

I assume the definitions of ‘power’ and ‘authority’ here.

Just war is, in a sense, power applied to bring social order out of social disorder. War is understood to involve at least two contrary powers. In order for war to be possible, there must be an order to which both powers actually belong.

An analogy to war is competitive sports. In football, two opposing teams compete against each other. Each team tries to accomplish two goals at once; to score touchdowns against its opponent and to prevent its opponent from scoring touchdowns against itself. There are intrinsic and extrinsic common goods proper to each team: Individual athletes must work well together as a team, and they all share in their team’s victories. There are, however, common goods proper to the game of football in general; goods in which all teams share even as they compete against each other.

With respect to the intrinsic common goods of the sport, if there were no rules for playing football, then there would be no game to play; and, if it were not assumed that both teams would honor the rules equally, then competition would not be possible. As for the extrinsic goods of the game (the goods for which those who compete or), were there none to be enjoyed, there would be no purpose for playing at all.

War is similar in the sense that there is an extrinsic common good that is supposedly exclusive to one party in the conflict: viz., the terms of victory and the driving motives for declaring war. However, if there were no fundamental order that was shared by all opposing forces, there would be no war: It is impossible for man to forge order out of absolute disorder. Man works with the raw materials of nature to fashion what he wills.

So, what is the order that enables man to wage war? Primarily, man desires to live and to live well. War is waged on this assumption; that death and needless suffering is to be avoided. However, peoples wage war by means of those who actively risk death and suffering on their behalf: The essence of a warrior is to undergo such risk for the sake of victory.

The relation between the warrior and the authority which empowers him to wage war implies the common nature of victory: Even fallen warriors can share victory. However, the good to which the warrior consecrates himself is greater than the admittedly thin consolation of posthumous victory and honor. If it were not the case that the warrior’s risk is itself a testament to the greatness of his cause, a good that encompasses his whole community, then military service should have no honor attached to it. In other words, if individual life and prosperity is the greatest good to which a man can aspire; if the commonweal is nothing greater than the totality of individual goods; or if the warrior’s moral calculus simply means gambling his life for a greater number of potential beneficiaries, then the warrior is reckless by nature.