When one takes what is
generally considered to be a "moral obligation," such as the golden
rule or the Decalogue, and compares such an imperative to its practical
application, he will soon find out that, in order to call it a law, he must
admit that it is more like a civil law than a scientific law; i.e., the "obligation"
is suggested but is not evident. The word implies being drawn from some
binding principle (cf. Latin, ligare), but there is nothing directly binding
about these moral imperatives. God Himself says, "Thou shalt not
steal," but people steal all the time, and without divine
intervention. The "obligation" of such imperatives are more
commonly understood in the sense that there are consequences for those who
would disobey them. In this sense, the imperative is conditional, and is
properly understood as implying an "if" clause: "Thou shalt not
steal - if thou wilt be spared," "Do unto others as ye would have
them do unto you - if ye wish to inherit the Kingdom,"
etc. This is probably the same way most people understand the moral
import of civil law, e.g. "pay your taxes - if you wish to avoid
punishment," which suggests that the "binding" quality of an
obligation is found merely in the connection between an action and its imposed
consequences.
There are still real
obligations, however, which are so immediately binding as to be called
"moral necessities." The Golden Rule nor any of the Ten
Commandments are moral necessities, properly speaking. This is simply
because of what necessity is: A necessity is that which cannot be
impossible or, in other words, a necessity is something which has no alternative. Take the 7th Commandment again: "Thou shalt
not steal." If it were a necessity, then nobody would be able to
steal and, in which case, it would be superfluous to demand that men keep to
their own property. It could be argued that the very fact of the
Commandments being commanded proves that they are not moral necessities, but
rather practical rules which are based on necessities.
It may be that moral necessities are so little known precisely because they are
necessary and not given to alteration or change of form based on their
practical import.
So, we are led to ask
the question, "what then, are the moral necessities?" Moral
necessities can be found in what is called the "Natural Law."
In this case, "law" is more akin to the laws of physics than the
civil law. The necessities found in the Natural Law cannot be escaped precisely
because they are necessary. One example of a moral necessity, and part of
said law, is that all men must will only what they desire. This is about
as practical as saying "all men must throw with their hands" but is
nevertheless important in understanding the rules of morality, just as the
necessity of throwing with one's hands is important in drafting the rules
of baseball. Nobody can choose to do something he does not desire to do (if
only at least for the sake of something else) because if he chooses to do
something he does not desire, he is not choosing it at all, but is rather
compelled by some outside force. (Here,
perhaps, one can see what St. Thomas Aquinas meant when he posited that, if God
were to “force” his will on a man, the man would still freely choose it because
God would be working through the man’s will. God does not impose on a man as a master
commanding a slave; rather, He works through men as the architect of his nature: It is a poor architect who struggles against
his own design. [S.T., P1, Q83, A1])
At this point, it is
now possible to show how the so-called moral imperatives are linked to moral
necessities. God, Who commanded certain
acts and forbade others, establishes the Natural Law in the act of creating
(and creation is not final but is ever dependent on its Creator), so His
commandments are inherently linked to man’s nature, man’s ultimate purpose or
end, and man’s happiness both now and in eternity. Consider that it is a moral necessity to
desire life and happiness. Revisiting
the 7th commandment once more, we are told “thou shalt not steal”
because man necessarily needs
material goods in order to live, it is necessary
for him to live in society with other men in order to be happy, and it is impossible for a man to maintain a healthy
society without mutually respect for the material goods they need. Of course it is not impossible for a man to
steal, but it is impossible to be
both a thief and a good neighbor. So,
though the imperative can be ignored, the necessity cannot, and by defying the former,
the latter becomes unbearable.
The fact that man must desire what is good (because it is
impossible not to) while at the same time choose
to do evil is mere evidence of the fact that he is broken. Even if he knew all the consequences of his
actions, both external and innate, he would still not necessarily have the
integrity to choose what he knows is good.
Men are not completely free to
choose what they want or know to be good. But this does not negate the fact
that each man would choose the good if it were in his power to do so. The more one looks at the human condition of
sin, his self-struggle, his incapacity to act in accord with his very nature, the
more one might doubt whether there is moral necessity at all, for who can claim
to act always with the clear aim of true and integral happiness, let alone
claim that he has attained it? Many
people would not even admit to having even a desire for happiness. But moral necessity, particularly that man
must desire and choose the good, is rooted in a metaphysical necessity; namely,
that all things are intrinsically good.
This deeper truth involves a commitment bordering on faith, the
affirmation of existence, echoing the very words of its Creator, Who is nothing
less than Goodness itself, “And God saw all the things that he had made, and
they were very good.” (Gen 1:31)
