Does the common good have primacy over the person, or is the person completely inviolable, even in the name of the common good? Understanding this question in a Thomistic context, the answer is something of a compromise between the two apparent options. In coming to this determination, however, we must discern what the person is, what the common good is, and what the relation is between the person and the common good. Once we grasp the full scope of this relation, we must conclude that the human person can only be perfected by acting for the sake of the common good.[1]
The Individual and the Person
In discussing the human person, we will make use of Jacques Maritain’s distinction between man-as-individual and man-as-person. Before defining the ‘person,’ however, we will consider what Maritain thinks about the individual:
Outside of the mind, only individual realities exist. Only they are capable of exercising the act of existing. Individuality is opposed to the state of universality which things have in the mind. It designates that concrete state of unity and indivision, required by existence, in virtue of which every actually or possibly existing nature can posit itself in existence as distinct from other beings. The angels are individual essences; the Divine Essence, in Its sovereign unity and simplicity, is supremely individual.[2]
We know what an individual is intuitively: when one comes to know what a thing is, his intellect defines that thing by differentiating it from others; specifically within a genus, and individually with reference to determinate matter.[3] This definition is the expression of the thing’s essence, which is, independent of the human intellect, the composite of substantial form and determinate matter.[4]
We cannot say, however, that only individual realities exist outside the mind absolutely, because nothing exists outside the mind of God. Everything is intelligible precisely because it has form: This form exists substantially outside the human intellect, but the existence of each form ultimately depends upon God, Who renders the forms intelligible and is the first formal cause of all things.[5] In short, all creatures exist by virtue of the Divine Intellect.
Moreover, everything participates in Being according to its essence, which is the source of its apparent individuality, but a thing is not identical to its essence. For example, every man is made according to a common nature, human nature, which is not only essential, but teleological. Interwoven in the essential union of form and matter is his final cause. To understand this “interweaving,” however, we must look past the immediate cause of man's being toward his ultimate Cause.
A thing is a man if it has a human form, but no man is self-informed: It is God who informs man. Hence, every man has an immediate formal cause, which is his soul, and an ultimate formal cause, which is God. Because substantial form is the determining factor of a thing's essence, and a thing's essence is its participation in Being, we may say that the immediate formal cause is a participation in the ultimate formal cause.
Though formal causation explains a man's existence simply, his nature is not fully understood without reference to final causation.[6] A thing’s final cause is simply that for the sake of which it acts. Therefore, whatever is good for a thing is good insofar as it concurs with its final cause.[7] Like all beings, man has a proximate final cause, which is his own perfection, and an ultimate final cause, which is God.[8] The ultimate final cause is not separate from the proximate final cause; rather, the latter is pursued for the sake of the former. Therefore, a creature approaches its perfection insofar as it approaches its last End.
Man, however, differs from irrational creatures in the way by which he attains his ultimate final cause: He is not ordered merely for God, but attains his end by knowing and loving God.[9] In other words, man is set above irrational creatures in that he attains his ultimate final cause, and thereby reaches his perfection, in the contemplation of the Divine.[10]
That man's perfection involves contemplation is indicative of Maritain's distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘person.’ Maritain observes that rational beings are not merely individuals, as St. Thomas says,“‘person’ signifies what is most perfect in all nature -- that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.”[11] In other words, personality is an aspect of the individual’s rationality. Maritain concludes, “personality, therefore, signifies interiority to self… it is the spirit in man which takes him, in contrast to the plant and animal, beyond the threshold of independence properly so called…”[12]
Though every creature is ordered toward the Good, the irrational creature’s participation in the Good is passive to the agency of Divine Providence.[13] Human beings, on the other hand, attain their ultimate End through the free exercise of reason and will. Therefore, their orientation to the Good is preeminently personal.
Having thus far distinguished essence from nature, we can see that individuality alone does not give us a complete picture of a man, because individuality is determined by merely essential characteristics (viz. specific form and determinate matter). Rather, each man is uniquely personal because of his rational nature, which includes not only his substantial form (i.e. his rational soul), but the end toward which his reason is ordered.
Hence, we may say that, because a man is a person, he transcends his individuality through the use of his active intellect. However, that man's powers are active in the attainment of his end does not preclude the participatory aspect of that end: The very act of intellection itself is perfected and governed by the Divine Intellect.[14] Therefore, man’s personality elevates him into a higher and more complete participation than that of the individual.
That the human intellect is a participation in the Divine Intellect can be seen in at least two ways. Firstly, man is by nature a rational animal, ordered to the use of his intellect by God. Therefore, the very act of intellection is a participation in the order of Divine Governance. Secondly, there must be an intelligent principle by which things are rendered intelligible. Man’s active intellect abstracts intelligible forms from that which he perceives; but the human intellect does not render the forms intelligible. Rather, forms are intelligible because they are the product of a higher Intelligence.[15] Therefore, even man’s free act of reason is a participation in the Divine Intellect.[16]
The Common Good
Now that an account of man has been given with respect to his individuality and his personality, we must take note of the recurring theme of participation. Man participates in Being according to his essence; he participates in the order of creation according to his nature, by acting for the sake of his final cause; and he participates in the Divine Intellect through the act of intellection. Furthermore, man’s rational nature indicates that human beings are not mere individuals, but persons; hence the highest mode of participation in the Good, which man enjoys as a rational creature, is preeminently personal.
That good in which things participate is the common good. Because every creature is ordered to God by way of its proximate final cause, we may say that every private good (i.e. the immediate good of the individual) is ordered ultimately to participation in the Common Good. Hence Thomas says, “in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation.”[17] This order of participation has its source in the Divine Intellect, which creates and governs all creation for Himself. It is therefore apparent that the extrinsic Common Good, in which all of creation participates, is none other than God Himself.
Even man’s particular, free acts of the will are ultimately ordered to the Common Good as their ultimate end.[18] However, we recall the difference between the participation of irrational creatures and that of persons: Irrational creatures participate by the necessity of nature, impressed upon them by their Creator, whereas persons (albeit in accord with their nature) participate by their own rational choice. Therefore, because participation requires the ordinance of reason, and reason is distinctly personal, we may conclude that the common good is fundamentally personal.[19]
Man's Relation to Man
We have thus far dealt with the participation of creation, especially that of the human person, in Divine Providence. Our discussion would not be complete, however, without touching upon the intrinsic common good of human society. Human persons are capable not only of participating in the order of Divine Providence, but of participating in a variety of relations that are shared with other human persons.
It would be misleading to assert that, because human society is primarily expressed in terms of relations, it is merely a relation; accidental or “emergent” upon the individuals who participate in it. Just as it belongs to man’s nature to participate in the ultimate Common Good, so too is it proper to man to participate in human society: He does not merely adopt society with other persons. He is born in it; moulded by it. His relation to other persons is not a mental categorization; rather, it imparts on him a unique character which determines how he communicates himself to others (as son, father, teacher, legislator, etc.).
That man is by nature ordered to participate in human society is primarily evident in his use of language.[20] Language itself is a common good, and not only does it have a uniquely human and inter-personal character, but it forms the very content of man’s rationality. Therefore, without some participation in human society, the person is, as Aristotle poetically quipped, “either a beast or a god.”[21]
Even the person who has fulfilled every other requirement of nature has need of human community. A brief example of this need can be seen in St. Thomas’ consideration of friendship:
If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.[22]
Note that the person’s participation in friendship is not exclusively for his own sake, but for the sake of his friends, and for the fellowship which is irreducible to any individual good.
Conclusion
In discussing the nature of the human person and his participation in the common good, we have come to two important conclusions. The first is that the human person cannot be understood without reference to the common good for which he is ordered. The second is that the common good cannot be anything other than that good which is preeminently personal. To say that the good of the person cannot be violated for the sake of the common good is inconsequential, because the common good is the highest good of the person. Likewise, to say that the common good has primacy over the person implies that the common good can exist outside the relation of persons, which has been proven false. Therefore, to fully understand man, we must duly consider both his personality and the common good for which he is made.
[1] We assume the distinction between the order of nature and the order of grace, and will discuss only the the order of nature, as grace is more suited to theological discussion.
[2] Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, 3, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947). At https://www3.nd.edu/~maritain/jmc/etext/CG03.HTM
[3] I.e. a species is differentiated within a genus by an essential difference; an individual is differentiated within a species by determinate matter.
[4] Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), 36 (IV.iii).
[5] Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, II, 4, 320, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), at https://dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics.htm.
[8] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 44, a. 4, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger, 1947), at https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/
[10] Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 2087, trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
[16] Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, 22, 1, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, SJ (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), at https://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer.htm.
[19] We might be more precise to say “interpersonal,” but space forbids miring ourselves in terminology.
[20] Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 1253a3-17, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
